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U.S. AND EEC TRADE POLICES: CONVERGENCE AND DIVERGENCE Jj'/ /, j.,@:iJ 
A good fight makes good copy. It is fairly well recognized 
by now, that the United States and the European Community are 
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in~ disagreement regarding several important areas of inter-
national trade. These conflicts are not cosmetic, but they 
are not the whole story either. And it is often more exciting 
to focus on conflict than to examine and assess the underlying 
issues of economic cost and benefit that frame our broader rela-
tionship with Europe. 
ELEMENTS OF DIVERGENCE 
It is easy to recite the litany of bilateral con!licts 
and multilateral differences that we have with the European 
Community at this point. 
o We object to the effect of EC agricultural export subsidies 
on world markets. 
o We refuse to freely accept subsidized and dumped steel 
from Europe at a time when our own steel industry is operating 
with severe losses and substantially below capacity. 
o We oppose recent EC proposals to further close the European 
market to U.S. agricultural trade. 
For its part, Europe has indicated that it will strongly oppose 
the extraterritorial extension of U.S. legal jurisdiction to 
its firms. Europe is gravely concerned with protectionist U.S. 
legislative initiatives, exemplified by the "domestic content" 
bill, unitary taxes, steel restraints, and a number of others. 
More broadly, the United States has tried since the 1982 
GATT Ministerial Meeting to find ways to strengthen the GATT 
mechanism in the service of freer trade, yet the Community has, 
of late, retreated from its traditional place in the frontlines 
of world trade liberalization, and has staked out a more negative 
position within the GATT on issues such as a Safeguards Code, 
renegotiation of the Government Procurement Code, and the initiation 
of a study of trade problems in high technology trade. 
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We Americans, when faced with difficulties and internal 
divisions, like to remember Benjamin Franklin's remark~bout 
the need for unity of the newly independent American colonie~ 
"Gentlemen," he reportedly said, "we must all hang together, 
or most assuredly, we shall hang separately." The wisdom of 
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that observati~n could clearly be applied to the situation we 
now face in trade policy with the European Community. 
Individually and collectively the countries of the European 
Community have been strong leaders and close partners in the 
construction of the post-war liberal economic order of freer 
trade, investment, and financial flows. In the 1970s and 1980s, 
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however, the oil shocks, persistent economic stagnation, and 
growing levels of unemployment began to undermine the unity 
of our trade policy views. Significant differences developed 
in our approaches to economic, trade, and development issues. 
During this period, strenuous efforts by both sides to manage 
contentious issues one at a time preserved our ability to cooperate 
towards maintenance of the the world trading system. 
The Community and the United States remain each others' 
largest trading partners. Two-way trade of over $90 billion 
in 1982 represented one-fifth of U.S. total trade and about 
one-sixth of EC external trade that year. 
And, as economically developed democracies, we share a 
desire to maximize individual well being within the larger framework 
of overall economic growth and development. It is now apparent 
that we also share the basic problem of restructuring our basic 
industries to meet difficult and rapidly changing economic con-
ditions. And at a time when traditional manufacturing jobs 
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are disappearing, demographics and new work patterns foretell 
increasing net additions to the work force, compounding the 
problem of adjustment. 
Most importantly, in the shared history of this century, 
we have learned together that economic growth and employment 
creation are intimately tied to the growth of international 
trade, and that our individual prosperity is dependent on the 
well being of our partners across the Atlantic. No amount of 
myopic isolationism or nationalism can change that reality. 
-ut it is not enough to say that because of 90 billion 
dollars worth of two-way trade that the U.S.-EC trade relationship 
is sound. 
It is not enough to say that because we share similar problems 
and similar aspirations that current differences on fundamentals 
are of no consequence. 
We have nearly 90 billion dollars worth of two-way trade 
with Canada as well, but the prospects for a positive dynamic 
relationship seem brighter there. To be sure, we have our differ-
ences; the Canadian NEP or National Energy Policy, for example, 
is a source of conflict. But what are we talking about now? 
Sectoral free trade arrangements. Exciting, job creating, trade 
liberalization. Our two countries are opening doors, not closing 
doors. 
Why isn't that the situation with the EC? It is a difficult 
question to answer, but perhaps by asking a few basic questions 
we can get some insight. · 
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Where do we differ on fundamentals? Is our educational 
system superior to theirs? Probably not. Is our work ethic 
more ingrained? Probably not. · Is our commitment to the ideals 
of democratic institutions more deeply held? I don't believe 
so. 
True, we need to address our high interest rates and our 
deficits. Our friends across the Atlantic are quick to blame 
our deficits for these high interest rates and consequently 
for the stagnation of their economies. They rarely mention 
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their own high deficits--deficits much higher a share of GNP 
than are ours. 
But now we are looking at some fundamental divergence that 
began our drift apart some twenty years ago. The U.S. is moving 
away from higher taxes, away from increased subsidies, and away 
from more governmental involvement in the private sector. Europe 
is not. Yet there are some in Europe who recognize that the 
strains are becoming unmanageable. 
We sit across the table from each other as friends--but 
we must defend our vital interests. We do damage control as 
best as friends can do, but sooner or later we must deal with 
the fundamentals. 
EMERGING ISSUES 
THE IMPORTANCE OF THE LDCs AND THE DEBT/TRADE LINK 
Our problems are not only with each other. We also share 
a growing dependence on the economic health of the developing 
' countries that have become the fastest growing markets for our 
manufactured exports. Both we and the Community know from the 
sad experience of our export balances in 1982 that the LDC debt 
problem has se·rious trade implications. This will continue 
to have a negative impact on economic recovery in the developed 
countries through shrinking export markets and increased import 
competition from LDC goods. 
And there is a broader threat to the world trading system 
itself. Under great economic stress ourselves, we must manage 
• 
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to keep our markets open if the debtor nations are to improve 
their ability to pay. At the same time, LDCs must be encouraged 
not to increase import protection and export subsidies that 
could create long-term distortions in world trade. It is imperative 
that the developed countries work toward coordinated trade and 
financial policies that address these linkages between structural 
adjustment, open markets, and world financial flows. 
INDUSTRIAL POLICY 
Differing views on the role of government in aiding industries 
have also been a source of some bilateral concern. Basic industries 
both here and in Europe have found adjustment to new economic 
realities difficult. At a time of recession-induced high unemploy-
ment, jobs lost to restructuring are doubly difficult to absorb. 
In the United States, we have focused on creating new jobs in 
new industries to replace those lost to economic change. Individual 
European Government policies in many cases, however, have focused 
on shielding industries (and their workers) from change, not 
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adapting to it. In industry, as in agriculture, the answer 
to difficult economic choices has often been to subsidize. 
This has become a further source of conflict between us, and 
shows promise ·of generating endless individual opportunities 
for current and future confrontation in trade matters, both 
in "sunset" and "sunrise" industries. 
A deeper issue, for both "sunrise" and "sunset" industries, 
is how do we assure fair competition in international trade 
between publicly-funded and private corporations. This issue 
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is unresolved. While the issue goes well beyond our bilateral 
relations with the Community, our ability to deal with it will 
have important consequences for this particularly important 
international relationship. 
